Significantly, similar language was used by Sullivan, who had been needled by a question from a Ukrainian activist who suggested the US was “afraid of Ukraine winning”.
They want Ukraine to win.
But very slowly.
Very, very slowly.
They want a war of attrition, they want to weaken Russia without the backlash of losing their own soldiers, Ukraine can’t win too fast, there can be no peace agreements either.
The US (and the rest of NATO) is being cautious for a reason, and it’s not because they’re using Ukrainians as “meat shields.”
NATO stocks of war materiel were at historically low levels before February 2022, and it’s difficult for the US to commit fully when China is sabre-rattling over Taiwan. That’s Xi’s (and Kim Jong-Un’s, to a lesser extent) gift to Putin. Sabre-rattling keeps the US from engaging fully in Ukraine, even though China won’t be ready to invade Taiwan for several years yet.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, it’ll be several years before NATO materiel stocks start to grow above 2022 levels, but they will grow.
The question is, will they grow fast enough?
Personally I’m predicting world war in 2027-28 unless the West pulls its finger out.
I disagree. In the case of Taiwan and China, it will be the United States Navy in conjunction with the Marines and Air Force that will help defend it.
In the case of the United States and NATO militarily intervening to help defend the Ukraine or Eastern Europe, it will largely be the United States army and the US Air Force in conjunction with our allies that would assist.
Those are two different and largely not overlapping forces in the United States military that would be in play. On the one hand, you have the Pacific fleet command in play, and the other hand you have the European NATO headquarters.
As far as the United States needing to go into a war economy to support prolonged and direct conflict that did not go nuclear, however, that could be a completely different issue. I will let the experts speak to that one.
That’s only true if China gets no further than attempting an amphibious landing on Taiwan. If China succeeds in creating a bridgehead on the island, then many of the same land-based weapons and systems that the US is currently supplying to Ukraine, or that Ukraine would like to have, come into play, including 155mm artillery, rocket artillery, tanks, air defence missiles, and land-based multirole aircraft like the F-16.
From a war planning point of view, unfortunately you can’t assume that China’s amphibious landing would fail. In fact, I think it’s more likely that China would succeed in establishing some kind of foothold on the island in the early stages of a future Taiwan war than not. If the amphibious force is large enough, it would be very difficult to eliminate all the landing craft, especially if there is a successful misdirection.
This is without considering that North Korea could also simultaneously launch a land-based attack on South Korea to dilute any US response in either theatre.
Crossing 100 miles of open ocean and landing troops on one of the limited beach areas on the island of Taiwan, which are bordered by builds up urban areas and mountains is going to be one of, if not the most difficult military operation ever to be attempted.
I really don’t see how China is going to conduct a faint in the open ocean when you have the United States Navy, the Japanese Maritime self-defense force, the Australian Navy, the Singaporean Navy, the Philippine and Thai navies, as well as Taiwan itself all monitoring every move China makes via satellite as well as using aerial reconnaissance assets. And the moment trying to decides to shoot down any surveillance planes will ratchet up tensions to the point where every single move they do will be challenged with carrier fleets and nuclear submarines operating in close proximity to their Chinese counterparts.
Just doesn’t seem likely to work like that. You cannot hide surface ships from satellites. China also doesn’t even have enough amphibious landing craft to land meaningful numbers of troops on shore. And even if they did, they would have to constantly resupply said troops while under fire. Good luck with that.
Considering the sheer amount of anti-aircraft missile systems that Taiwan fields, as well as artillery and heavy weapon systems it will be ridiculously difficult to land troops there. But if China wants to throw hundreds and thousands of ships to the bottom of the ocean and lose tens of thousands of their own trained soldiers, I guess that’s their prerogative.
They would be much more likely to win if they simply embargo the island permanently, but that would induce the wrath of the United States Navy and risk direct confrontation between the PL n and one of our fleets operating probably in a similar manner to the grain fleets coming out of the Ukraine right now.
Which means politically speaking, this is all a big game of chicken with the potential to cause nuclear devastation in both China and the United States. And potentially Japan.
The real meat shields in the war in Ukraine are Russian conscripts. At least Ukrainian conscripts have the conviction that they are defending their country’s internationally recognised borders.
Unlikely; a quicker victory against Russia would be more damaging politically to Putin, and a “weaker” Russia isn’t necessarily a less dangerous Russia, as nukes don’t need a lot of manpower to operate.
They want Ukraine to win.
But very slowly.
Very, very slowly.
They want a war of attrition, they want to weaken Russia without the backlash of losing their own soldiers, Ukraine can’t win too fast, there can be no peace agreements either.
They want to sell guns, while weakening their competition.
They’ve found the best way to reduce the threat of Russia without committing troops.
Yes, using Ukrainians as meat shields.
The US (and the rest of NATO) is being cautious for a reason, and it’s not because they’re using Ukrainians as “meat shields.”
NATO stocks of war materiel were at historically low levels before February 2022, and it’s difficult for the US to commit fully when China is sabre-rattling over Taiwan. That’s Xi’s (and Kim Jong-Un’s, to a lesser extent) gift to Putin. Sabre-rattling keeps the US from engaging fully in Ukraine, even though China won’t be ready to invade Taiwan for several years yet.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, it’ll be several years before NATO materiel stocks start to grow above 2022 levels, but they will grow.
The question is, will they grow fast enough?
Personally I’m predicting world war in 2027-28 unless the West pulls its finger out.
I disagree. In the case of Taiwan and China, it will be the United States Navy in conjunction with the Marines and Air Force that will help defend it.
In the case of the United States and NATO militarily intervening to help defend the Ukraine or Eastern Europe, it will largely be the United States army and the US Air Force in conjunction with our allies that would assist.
Those are two different and largely not overlapping forces in the United States military that would be in play. On the one hand, you have the Pacific fleet command in play, and the other hand you have the European NATO headquarters.
As far as the United States needing to go into a war economy to support prolonged and direct conflict that did not go nuclear, however, that could be a completely different issue. I will let the experts speak to that one.
That’s only true if China gets no further than attempting an amphibious landing on Taiwan. If China succeeds in creating a bridgehead on the island, then many of the same land-based weapons and systems that the US is currently supplying to Ukraine, or that Ukraine would like to have, come into play, including 155mm artillery, rocket artillery, tanks, air defence missiles, and land-based multirole aircraft like the F-16.
From a war planning point of view, unfortunately you can’t assume that China’s amphibious landing would fail. In fact, I think it’s more likely that China would succeed in establishing some kind of foothold on the island in the early stages of a future Taiwan war than not. If the amphibious force is large enough, it would be very difficult to eliminate all the landing craft, especially if there is a successful misdirection.
This is without considering that North Korea could also simultaneously launch a land-based attack on South Korea to dilute any US response in either theatre.
Crossing 100 miles of open ocean and landing troops on one of the limited beach areas on the island of Taiwan, which are bordered by builds up urban areas and mountains is going to be one of, if not the most difficult military operation ever to be attempted.
I really don’t see how China is going to conduct a faint in the open ocean when you have the United States Navy, the Japanese Maritime self-defense force, the Australian Navy, the Singaporean Navy, the Philippine and Thai navies, as well as Taiwan itself all monitoring every move China makes via satellite as well as using aerial reconnaissance assets. And the moment trying to decides to shoot down any surveillance planes will ratchet up tensions to the point where every single move they do will be challenged with carrier fleets and nuclear submarines operating in close proximity to their Chinese counterparts.
Just doesn’t seem likely to work like that. You cannot hide surface ships from satellites. China also doesn’t even have enough amphibious landing craft to land meaningful numbers of troops on shore. And even if they did, they would have to constantly resupply said troops while under fire. Good luck with that.
Considering the sheer amount of anti-aircraft missile systems that Taiwan fields, as well as artillery and heavy weapon systems it will be ridiculously difficult to land troops there. But if China wants to throw hundreds and thousands of ships to the bottom of the ocean and lose tens of thousands of their own trained soldiers, I guess that’s their prerogative.
They would be much more likely to win if they simply embargo the island permanently, but that would induce the wrath of the United States Navy and risk direct confrontation between the PL n and one of our fleets operating probably in a similar manner to the grain fleets coming out of the Ukraine right now.
Which means politically speaking, this is all a big game of chicken with the potential to cause nuclear devastation in both China and the United States. And potentially Japan.
I see, it is now fully justified of them to use Ukrainians as meatshields, thank you for your kind explanation.
The real meat shields in the war in Ukraine are Russian conscripts. At least Ukrainian conscripts have the conviction that they are defending their country’s internationally recognised borders.
Ah, so they should just stop helping. Yes?
Unlikely; a quicker victory against Russia would be more damaging politically to Putin, and a “weaker” Russia isn’t necessarily a less dangerous Russia, as nukes don’t need a lot of manpower to operate.
But a quick war isn’t as profitable for the military industrial complex